Gas prices are only part of the game of energy politics Russia is playing with Europe．There is also a fierce contest about the merits of new oil and gas pipelines from east to west． Some of these would increase Russia’s clout：others are planned to diminish it；pretty much all are contentious．
　　None more so than a proposed 1，200km，$5 billion pipeline along the Baltic seabed．To be completed in 2010，it will be 30%costlier than an overland version，but offers Russia’s gas export mortopolv，Gazprom，a direct link with its main west European markets．That will bypass Poland and the Baltic states，which had hoped for an alternative route bringing them extra transit fees．
　　Some doubt if it will ever be built．“l would just love to see a feasibility study of this project，”says one EU official．“They are j ust using it to put pressure on Poland and Ukraine to back down in transit negotiations．”he continues．
　　The new deal certainly threatens the Poles and Baltic states--and with more than lost fees．Russia could，at least in theory，cut off gas to them for political reasons，while continuing to supply western Europe．③That has prompted fierce criticism--some politicians even call it the energy version of the Nazi- Soviet pact of l939．
　　The dilemma for Russia’s gas customers，given the supplier’s tarnished reputation for reliability，is whether to swallow hard and try to hook up to the new pipeline，or to diversify their sources of supply．④ For the northern post—communist countries．neither looks promising．
　　PerhaDs more worrying for the ex-communist countries is Russia’s investment in their domestic energy industries．Gazprom has been buying up distribution networks．Estonia，praised for selling equal stakes in its national gas company to Gazprom and a German investor in the l990s，is now having second thoughts．Any attempt to diversify supply，for example by building a pipeline from Finland，could be stymied by the company that would need to buy，distribute and sell the gas．
　　In the end，small countries such as the Baltic states，or even a larger one like Poland，can do little on their own to ensure their energy security．The east European countries’hopes rest mainly on a common European energy policy．But that will need time，money and effort of a kind that the EU rarely devotes to immediate problems。let alone long-term ones． [398 words]
　　1．Russia can be thought of as______
　　A．a superpower
　　B．a reliable neighbor
　　C．an unreliable ally
　　D．an energy empire
　　2．What worries the ex-communist countries most is______．
　　A．a common European energy policy
　　B．the diverse sources of gas supply
　　C．the unreliable gas supply from Russia D．the new pipeline along the Baltic seabed
　　3．The energy security for east European countries is______．
　　A．doubtless
　　B．ensured
　　C．out of question
　　D．out of the question
　　4．It is a______for Estonia to have sold its gas stakes to Russia．
　　A．regret
　　B．pride
　　C．praise
　　D．setback
　　5．Which of the following best summarizes the main idea of the text?
　　A．Russia’s energy riches are bringing it political power．
　　B．A new pipeline along the Baltic seabed has been proposed．
　　C．The Poles and Baltic states are threatened by the new deal．
　　D．Gazprom will have a direct link with west European countries．

难句透析
　　①Some of these would increase Russia’S clout；0thers are planned to diminish it：”pretty much all are conten— tious．
　　【结构】本句是由分号连接的三个分句组成的并列句。代词“these”指前一句中的“pipelines”考试大。
　　【释义】有些石油和天然气管道会提升俄罗斯的影响力，另一些管道会降低其影响力，几乎所有管道都存在争议。②None more S0 than a proposed l·200km，$5 billion pipeline alo’ng the Baltic seabed．[To be completed in2010]，it will be 30％—costlie—r than an overland version，but offers Russia’s gas export monopoly，Gazprom，a di— rect link with its main west European markets．
　　【结构】第一句中的“None more SO than”相当于“None is more contentious than”，这是接续上一句意思所做的进一步说明。代词“it”是第二句的主语，指“pipeline”，后跟有用“but”连接的两个并列的谓语动词“will be”和“of fers”。
　　【释义】没有哪个管道比提议建设穿过波罗的海海底的管道更引人争议了。这个管道长达1200公里，造价50亿美元，预计2010年建成，将比在地面铺设造价高30％，但是，将把俄罗斯的天然气出口垄断企业，俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司，与西欧的主要市场直接连接起来。