¡¡¡¡Privatization in developing countries cannot produce goods and services efficiently without substantial reform in the market and regulatory procedures. Policy makers interested in privatization as a policy measure should consider carefully the multiple objectives at the national level.31. It can be inferred from the text that economic purists

¡¡¡¡\[A\] oppose shifting goods from public to private.

¡¡¡¡\[B\] support the substantial reform of privatization.

¡¡¡¡\[C\] approve privatization only in developed nations.

¡¡¡¡\[D\] have a strict description of public merchandise.

¡¡¡¡32. Since 1980s, there has been

¡¡¡¡\[A\] broad international support for privatization.

¡¡¡¡\[B\] much evidence for privatization in poor nations.

¡¡¡¡\[C\] endorsement for privatization of donor agencies.

¡¡¡¡\[D\] maximum dependence on private capital in the U.S..

¡¡¡¡33. The authorities of developing nations seem incapable of

¡¡¡¡\[A\] attaining political stability.

¡¡¡¡\[B\] making major policy shifts.

¡¡¡¡\[C\] upgrading basic urban economy.

¡¡¡¡\[D\] enhancing production efficiency.

¡¡¡¡34. The author¬ðs appraisal of Honduras study implies that in developing countries

¡¡¡¡\[A\] direct administration of services requires more capital.

¡¡¡¡\[B\] their marketplace system leaves much to be desired.

¡¡¡¡\[C\] privatization is politically unfit for their economies.

¡¡¡¡\[D\] new facilities rather than contracting out are needed.

¡¡¡¡35. The author¬ðs primary intention is to

¡¡¡¡\[A\] outline major hindrance to privatization in developing nations.

¡¡¡¡\[B\] offer a solution for the future course of economic policy shifts.

¡¡¡¡\[C\] justify heavier reliance on the private sector in the Third World.

¡¡¡¡\[D\] explain requirements for privatization of the Third World economies.

¡¡¡¡Text4

¡¡¡¡Many critics of the current welfare system argue that existing welfare regulations foster family instability. They maintain that those regulations which exclude most poor husbandª²andª²wife families from Aid to Families with Dependent Children(AFDC) assistance grants, contribute to the problem of family dissolution. Thus, they conclude that expanding the set of families eligible for family assistance plans or guaranteed income measures would result in a marked strengthening of the lowª²income family structure.

¡¡¡¡If all poor families could receive welfare, would the incidence of instability change markedly? The answer to this question depends on the relative importance of three categories of potential welfare recipients. The first is the ¡°cheater¡±¡ªthe husband who is reported to have abandoned his family but in fact disappears only when the social caseworker is in the neighborhood. The second consists of a loving husband and devoted father leaves so that his wife and children may enjoy the relative benefit provided by public assistance. There is very little evidence that these categories are significant.

¡¡¡¡The third category is the unhappily married couple, who remain together out of a sense of economic responsibility for their children, because of the high costs of separation, or because of the consumption benefit of marriage. This group is large. The formation, maintenance, and dissolution of the family is in large part a function of the relative balance between the benefits and costs of marriage as seen by the individual members of the marriage. The major benefit generated by the creation of a family is the expansion of the set of consumption possibilities. The benefits from such a partnership depend largely on the relative dissimilarity of the resources or basic endowments each partner brings to the marriage. Persons with similar productive capacities have less economic ¡°cement¡± holding their marriage together. Since the family performs certain functions society regards as vital, a complex network of social and legal buttresses has evolved to reinforce marriage. Much of the variation in marital stability across income classes can be explained by the variation in costs of dissolution imposed by society.

¡¡¡¡Marital stability is related to the costs of achieving an acceptable agreement on family consumption and production and to the prevailing social price of instability in the marriage partners¬ð socialª²economic group. Expected AFDC income exerts pressures on family instability by reducing the cost of dissolution. So welfare opportunities are a significant determinant of family instability in poor neighborhoods, but this is not the result of AFDC regulations that exclude most intact families from coverage. Rather, welfareª²related instability occurs because public assistance lowers both the benefits of marriage and the costs of its disruption by providing a system of governmentª²subsidized alimony(maintenance) payments.36. The text is written with the aim of