The unhappy history of Ukraine, Russia and gas is the story of energy security in miniature. When it comes to hydrocarbons, geopolitics and geology are inextricable. That is a problem for most countries in eastern Europe, which would love to get their energy from allies, and feel understandably twitehy about having their former master as a big supplier.
　　Russia sees it differently. It wants to use its energy riches to the maximum effect in the world market. It sees former communist satellite countries as nuisances, which scrounge subsidised gas, pay late if at all, and jeopardise sales to western Europe by brinkmanship about transit fees.
　　It is easy to understand why Ukraine and other Russian neighbours are exasperating Gazprom, Russia’s huge gas monopoly. Its gas has long been siphoned off in vast quantities and Ukraine, like Georgia, has a dreadful record of falling behind with its payments. The main power station that supplies Moldova doesn’t pay its bills at all. In 2005 Ukraine paid only $ 50 per 1,000 cubic metres of Russian gas, compared with the $ 240 paid by the EU. Now Gazprom says it wants to sell to these countries on a purely commercial basis.
　　That seems fair enough, but there is another dimension. Formally, at least, the $ 50 price is part ofa framework that is supposed to last until 2009. Moreover, Gazprom is not asking for the same increase from each of Russia’ s neighbours. The independent Baltic states have two years to adjust. Georgia, which like Ukraine has an independent streak, faces a doubling of prices. Belarus, still friendly and dependable, is keeping its price and giving away part of the control of the pipeline to Russia instead. Gazprom and its chairman, Dmitry Medvedev, who moonlights as the head of Vladimir Putin’ s presidential administration, decided which deal is presented to which country. And Russia’s way of pressing its case was an example of energy politics of the most brutal sort.
　　On January 1st, when Russia kept gas out of the Brotherhood pipeline crossing Ukraine, it also stopped gas from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, big suppliers to the country, from flowing through its pipes. Although enough was left for the rest of Europe, Ukraine simply tapped off some gas for itself as usual. Theft, Gazprom called it; though the Ukrainians asserted they were taking only the Turkmen and Kazakh gas that was due to them. For European consumers, the argument was academic. All that mattered was their shortages of gas. Italy experienced a fall of one-quarter; France, one-third; it was worse in countries such as Hungary, Austria and the Czech Republic, which get more of their supplies from Russia. [440 words]
　　1. The author tells us that______
　　A. Ukraine has a long unhappy history
　　B. energy security is closely related to geopolitics
　　C. energy security depends heavily on geology
　　D. most countries in eastern Europe are allies
　　2. According to the text, Russia______
　　A. manages to make the best use of its energy riches
　　B. holds its former satellite countries in high esteem
　　C. feels somewhat twitchy about being a big gas supplier
　　D. jeopardises its sales to countries in eastern Europe
　　3. That ______is enraging Gazprom.
　　A. gas is sold on a purely commercial basis
　　B. subsidized gas is sold to some former allies
　　C. gas has to be sold at an unreasonably low price
　　D. the price paid by EU is much higher than by Ukraine
　　4. Which of the following can account for Russia’s brutal energy politics?
　　A. Gazprom is Russias huge gas monopoly.
　　B. Gazprom requires the same increase from each of its consumers.
　　C. The chairman of Gazprom is highly regarded by Vladimir Putin.
　　D. The extreme unfairness in the way Russia uses to make a deal.
　　5. According to the author, what matters most is that ______
　　A. many countries depend on Russia for their energy supply
　　B. Russia cut gas supplies to Ukraine, thus causing a turmoil
　　C. Gazprom decides which deal is presented to which country
　　D. some countries unexpectedly steal gas from Russias pipelines